The Seat Belt Defense--An Exercise in Sophistry by Kleist, J. Murray
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 18 | Issue 3 Article 6
1-1967
The Seat Belt Defense--An Exercise in Sophistry
J. Murray Kleist
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
J. Murray Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense--An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 Hastings L.J. 613 (1967).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol18/iss3/6
The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise
in Sophistry
By J. Muma_- KLms*
D EFENSE attorneys have recently proposed the "seat belt defense"
as a new basis for defeating injury claims. It would allow the de-
fendant, and thus his liability insurance carrier, to escape liability for
injuries suffered by the plaintiff in a collision caused by the defen-
dant's negligence. This result would theoretically occur whenever the
plaintiff was not wearng a seat belt at the time of the collision. The
contention is that failure to wear a seat belt constitutes contributory
negligence. The syllogism proceeds as follows:
(1) The standard of conduct to which a plaintiff must conform
for his own protection m order to avoid contributory negli-
gence is the conduct of a reasonable man under similar cir-
cumstances.
(2) A reasonable man knows of the risk of being involved in a
collision and of the protection afforded by seat belts.
(3) Therefore, a motorist who fails to wear a seat belt has not
conformed to the conduct of a reasonable man and is guilty
of contributory negligence.
The argument is superficially plausible, but fallacious. Nevertheless, as
New York Justice Manuel Levine stated in a recent address:
It needs no ingemous exercise of forevision to reach the conclusion
that the legal problems arsing from the failure to wear available seat
belts will be dealt with both by the attorneys and the courts. I have
been reliably informed by representatives of an insurance company
which operates nationally that orders have gone out to every in-
vestigator to ascertain whether, at the time of the accident, seat belts
were available and whether they were being used. i
To date, most trial courts have refused to allow the proposed de-
fense and two recent appellate court decisions have repudiated it.2
Member, Washmagton Bar.
lAddress by Justice Manuel Levme, American Trial Lawyers Ass'n Convention,
July 25, 1966, Los Angeles, California.
2 Brown v. Kendnck, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1966); Kavanagh v.
Butonc, 221 NE.2d 824 (Ind. App. 1966).
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However, a few favorable rulings at the trial level,3 and a few pro-
defense articles,4 continue to give the seat belt defense proponents
some encouragement. Plaintiff-lawyers cannot safely assume that every
trial judge will recognize the fallacies inherent in the seat belt defense
argument without the aid of some analysis.
Questions of--Safety-Causation-Duty
Ever since the recent exposure of the auto-manufacturers' lack of
concern for the safety of motorists, these manufacturers have tried to
shift the blame for the highway slaughter onto the injured victims
themselves. In hopes of avoiding some of the criticism, the manu-
facturers point out that according to most statistics only about 15 per
cent of the nation's motorists use seat belts even though they have
been offered as optional equipment for several years. Although it is
difficult to ascertain the accuracy of such statistics, it is at least clear
that the use of seat belts has not become the habit and custom of the
average motorist.
Moreover, there exists a considerable controversy as to the real
value of seat belts. In the comprehensive study conducted by Motor
Vehicle Research, Inc., hundreds of controlled crashes at various
speeds with dummies simulating the human body placed in various
positions with and without seat belts were observed by specially lo-
cated cameras, and it was concluded that the standard waist type
seat belts can cause more, rather than less, injuries in many crash
conditions.5 Other researchers have reached the conclusion that the
3 Stockinger v. Dumsch (Cir. Ct. Sheboygan Caty., Wis. 1965); Busick v. Budner
(Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Cnty., 1965).
4 SeatBelt Defense, 7 Defense Research Inst., For the Defense, Feb. 1966; Note,
Automobile Seat Belts: Protection for Defendants as Well as for Motorsts, 38 So. CAL.
L. REV. 733 (1965).
The author of the latter article points out that it may be contended that failure to
use a seat belt is negligence per se in those states which have statutes requiring the
installation of seat belts. E.g., CAL. VEmCLE ConE § 27304; Wis. STAT. 347.48 (1963).
He notes, however, that the Califoria statute applies only to new cars sold at retail
in California after January 1, 1964, and comments: "lit is arguable that the legislature
did not intend any such duty to arise as to all motorists, but only to those using vecles
included within the statute." Id. at 735-36.
Tis author did not take into consideration the question of whether or not a
defendant is within the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute. He
did not consider the dual standard for determining negligence but instead assumed:
"[TIhe question of reasonable care is virtually the same in proving negligence as in
proving contributory negligence for violation of safety equipment statutes " Id. at
735. He failed to recognize that the law allows the plaintiff to assume that others upon
the highway will obey the laws until put on specific notice to the contrary.
51 MoToR VEmci. Esnm=uEc INc., Rep. No. 3 (1958).
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use of seat belts is limited in value.' Therefore, whether or not the use
of waist type seat belts is desirable remains at best speculative. Until
more definitive answers are available the defense that the plaintiff is
guilty of contributory negligence in not wearing a seat belt is subject
to the objection that such a defense is pure conjecture.
Notwithstanding the present uncertainty in this area, the plaintiff's
legal position as a result of a collision caused solely by defendant's
negligence should be considered. Assuming merely for the sake of
argument that wearing seat belts would reduce injuries in 75 per cent
of all collisions, the motorist, when he enters his car, cannot be as-
sured that the collision he might have will not be one of the 25 per
cent in which the seat belt nught increase the degree of injury In any
given collision, no doctor can say exactly what injuries would have
been suffered had the victim been wearing a seat belt as compared
to those he suffered without it. There are too many unknown variables
such as exact number, degree, direction, duration, and kinds of forces
that might have been acting in any given accident to answer the ques-
tion with any accuracy The problem is further complicated when one
considers the effect of these forces in conjunction with the positions
of potential obstacles such as dashknobs, turn sigual levers, etc. When
a motorist gets into a car he undoubtedly has a general knowledge
that accidents can and do happen, but he obviously does not know if,
how, when, or where it may happen. In such circumstances it does
violence to one's sense of justice to say that the innocent injured victim
must bear the risk of a wrong guess. It is therefore not surprising that
the law has not yet placed upon the plaintiff a duty to wear seat belts.
The premises upon which the seat belt defense is based create the
false inference that the plaintiff, in order to avoid the bar of contribu-
tory negligence, must protect hnnself against the mere future possi-
bility that someone, sometime, somewhere, may negligently collide
with him. To the contrary, the plaintiff, until put on notice of a specific
act of negligence, has the right to assume that other persons upon the
highways will not be negligent and therefore need not truss himself
up in every known safety apparatus before proceeding on the highway
6Fisher, Injury Produced by Seat Belts, Report of 2 Cases, 7 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL
MEDIcn;E 211 (1965); Rubovits, Traumatic Rupture of the Pregnant Uterus from "Seat
Belt" Injury, 90 AMki. J. OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 828 (1964); White, The Role
of Safety Belts in the Motorist's Safety, 9 CLIIcAL OnR-oPEDics 317 (1957). In Brown
v. Kendnck, 192 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) the court stated: "The
problem of the seat belts is coming to be more m the public eye today There has
been and still exists controversy over the safety feature of seat belts." See 16 Am. JuRi.
PROOF OF FACTS, SrAT BELT AccrDENTs § 52 (1965).
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The rule is so fundamental that it has been adopted as a uniform in-
struction in Califorma7 and Washington8 with slight variations in the
wording. The California mstruction places a condition upon the
plaintiff's right to assume that others will obey the law. However this
condition arises only when the plaintiff becomes aware of some specific
negligence on the part of another driver at which time he has the duty
to use reasonable care to avoid a collision even though he may have
previously been completely free from contributory negligence.
For policy reasons, which will be discussed later, a different rule
may apply to a defendant in a similar situation. Since the current trend
in the law is to impose a stricter duty on one to exercise reasonable
care to avoid harm to another,0 the defendant is not necessarily en-
titled to assume that others will obey the laws. A defendant may be
liable for all of the consequences following his negligent act, includ-
ing the intervening negligence of a third person, if, in the light of
common experience, such consequences were not highly extraordinary
or unforseeable. 11 Thus, a defendant railroad was held to have an
affirmative duty to take reasonable care to protect its employees against
the foreseeable risk of another's negligence.'2
Contributory Negligence-Public Policy
The desire to compensate injured persons and effect a wide and
efficient distribution of accident losses is the major force shaping tort
7 1 CALwo-ruA Jxmy INsmtucTroxs Civir. No. 138 (1956). It reads: "A person who,
himself, is exercising ordinary care has a right to assume that others, too, will perform
their duty under the law, and he has a further right to rely and act on that assumption.
Thus it is not negligence for such a person to fail to anticipate an accident which can
be occasioned only by a violation of law or duty by another." [However, an exception
should be noted: the rights just defined do not exist when it is reasonably apparent to
one, or in the exercise of ordinary care would be apparent to him, that another is not
going to perform his duty.]
8 Kmo Cotwry UN roi_ CODE, Instruction No. 40. It reads: "A person using the
highway has the right to assume that other persons thereon will obey the traffic laws,
and he has the right to proceed upon such assumption until he knows, or in the exercise
of reasonable care should know, to the contrary." See Ke]sey v. Pollock, 59 Wash. 2d 796,
370 P.2d 598 (1962); Green v. Floe, 28 Wash. 2d 620, 183 P.2d 771 (1947).
9 2 HAniER & JAams, ToRTs § 22.10, at 1229 (1956).
10 Ibid.
11 Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1955); Morrison v. Medaglia, 287
Mass. 46, 191 N.E.2d 133 (1934); Hall v. Coble Dames, Inc., 234 N.C. 206, 67 S.E.2d
63 (1951); Jones v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 210 S.C. 470, 43 S.E.2d 355 (1947);
Palin v. General Constr. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 246, 287 P.2d 325 (1955); McLeod v. Grant
County School Dist., 42 Wash. 24 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953). See REsTATmmNT -(SEc-
otNo), Tonvs §§ 442-43, 447 (1965).
12 Mortenson v. Southern Pac. Co., 245 A.C.A. 248, 53 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1966).
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law today 13 The courts and legislatures have reflected this social policy
by expanding the basis for liability on the one hand and restricting
the traditional defenses to liability on the other.'- Compensation for
the injured has been facilitated by the growth of the family car doc-
trme,15 the expansion of vicarious liability,16 and the development of
strict liability in products cases.'7 At the same tune, the defenses of
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and interspousal and gov-
ernmental immunity have been restricted and whittled away 18 The
simultaneous expansion of the scope of negligence and the narrowing
of the scope of contributory negligence is noted by Professors Harper
and James:
Since the advent of the automobile there has been a growing realiza-
tion that the plight of the uncompensated accident victim presents a
grave social problem The matter of compensation to victims
therefore has been increasingly recognized by courts, legislatures,
and the public as a matter of serious social concern transcending in-
dividual hardship [T]he tendency of 3unes and even courts for
some time has been to find fault more and more easily in order to
afford compensation wherever the present concept could be stretched
to allow it.19
There are ever growing limitations on the lands of actions in which
the defense [of contributory negligence] will be permitted..
Under the formal structure of tort law the concept of negligence
is to be found on both sides of the scale in these cases. This holds out
a specious appearance of symmetry that has beguiled many a com-
mentator into supposing that the concept has or should have pretty
much the same connotation on either side. A moment's reflection,
however, will show that this would be most surprising if it were true.
The shift in outlook toward accident liability that has taken place
over the last century has led to an ever increasing expansion of the
1s See generally 2 HARPER & JAmms, op. cit. supra note 9, § 22.1, PTossER, ToRTS
§ 43, at 258 (3d ed. 1964); James, Imputed Negligence and Vicarious Liability: The
Study of a Paradox, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 48 (1957); James, Indemnity, Subrogation,
and Contribution and the Efficent Distribution of Accident Losses, 21 NACCA L.J.
360 (1958); Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 20 Fomnam L. REv. 156 (1951); Small, The Effect of Workmen's Com-
pensation Trends on Agency-Torts Concepts of Scope of Employment, 10 NACCA L.J.
21 (1953); Wolfstone, Imputation of Contributory Negligence, m 1 PmBsoNLINjiinY
LmAmrry 241 (C.E.B. 1966).
'4 Wolfstone, supra note 13, at 241.
15 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 9, § 26.15, at 1419-21.
'OId. § 26.1, at 1361-64.
17 PnossER, op. cit. supra note 13, § 97, at 672-74. See generally Prosser, Strict
Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HAurmcs L.J. 9 (1967).
18 See generally PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 13, §§ 64, 67, 116, 125.
19 2 HARPER & JAMEs, op. cit. supra note 9, § 26.5, at 1370-71. (Footnotes omitted.)
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concept of negligence where that will lead to compensating an acci-
dent victim for his loss. It would be strange indeed if there had been
a concomitant expansion of the negligence which would cut that com-
pensation off. Every practical man knows this has not been the case.
What has emerged has been a double standard which in all candor
ought to be recognized. 20
Illustrative of this trend toward a double standard in determining
negligence or contributory negligence are cases holding that contribu-
tory negligence will not be imputed to bar a recovery even though
in the same circumstances, the negligence would be imputed to facili-
tate recovery 2 1 The reasoning in support of the abolition of the so-
called "both ways test" in the area of vicarious liability is apropos in
the case of seat belts. As stated in Johnson v. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor
Express, Inc.,22 the policy which justifies expanding liability does not
justify expanding contributory negligence:
The practical necessity for imposing liability on an owner in cases
which do justify the doctrine of imputed liability is not present in
the situation where the owner is an in]ured passenger in his own
car. The two-way test of the Restatement does not commend itself
as either useful or necessary. Its only virtue, as pointed out in Harper
and James , is that it is logical and symmetrical. Important legal
rights ought to have better footing than mere architectural sym-
metry.
2 3
Even before the modem trend toward enhancing an injured vic-
tim's chance of compensation, the doctrine of contributory negligence
was assailed as unjustifiably harsh and unduly strict. The idea that
the slightest degree of contributory negligence should operate as a
complete bar to recovery regardless of the degree of negligence of the
defendant has long been considered unpalatable by legal scholars.24
Moreover, since in most jurisdictions contributory negligence is an
affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the defen-
dant,25 it is highly unlikely that the jury, the trier of facts, will en-
thusiastically espouse a defense which will completely defeat an other-
wise wholly innocent victim.
20 Id. § 22.4, at 1209-10.
21 Bncker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21 N.W.2d 105 (1946); Weber v. Stokely-
Van Camp, Inc., - Minn. -, 144 N.W.2d 540 (1966); Johnson v. Los Angeles-Seattle
Motor Express, Inc., 222 Ore. 377, 352 P.2d 1091 (1960). -
22222 Ore. 377, 352 P.2d 1091 (1960).
23 Id. at 387, 352 P.2d 1095.
24 See 2 HARPER & JA Ms, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 22.1-.3; PNossER, op. cit. supra
note 13, § 64, at 428; ULmA, A JuDGE TAKrs TH STAND 104-07 (1933); Lowndes,
Contributory Negligence, 22 CE . L.J. 674 (1934).25 PRossE, op. cit. supra note 13, § 64, at 426.
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The seat belt defense, if allowed, would be a complete contradic-
tion to the whole modern trend of tort law 26 It would expand the
scope of contributory negligence beyond its broadest application.
Even Justice Levine and the anonymous writer for the Defense Re-
search Institute, were squeamish about attempting to fit the seat belt
defense within the doctrine of contributory negligence, -suggesting
that apportionment of damages would be a more appropriate solu-
tion in seat belt cases:
States which hold that contributory negligence is a complete bar to
recovery could, however, recognize a different rule in seat belt lia-
bility cases. A distinction can be made between the negligent act
of the defendant which caused the accident and the contributorily
negligent act of the plaintiff by not wearing a seat belt which was a
substantial contributing factor in causig his m]nes. In a situation
where plamtiffs prior conduct is found to have played no part in
bringing about an impact or accident but has aggravated the ensuing
damages, the better view is to reduce plaintiffs recovery to the extent
that his damages have been aggravated by his own conduct.
27
In the few ]urisdictions that have adjudicated the specific factual
problem presented in the quotation above (where the plaintiffs prior
negligence has in no way caused the accident but has enhanced the
damages), the courts are split.2 Some courts have held that the plain-
tiff may recover the full measure of damages; 29 others have approved
apportionment of damagess in cases where the plaintiff's concurrent
negligence has been convincingly establishedBi It seems inconceivable
in light of the present uncertainty respecting the value of seat belts
and the highly speculative nature of any attempt to differentiate be-
tween injuries occurring with or without safety belts that courts would
adopt the apportionment of damages defense to limit plaintiff's re-
covery.
2 6 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
2
7 Seat Belt Defense, Defense Research Inst., 7 For the Defense, Feb. 1966; Ad-
dress by Justice Manuel Levine, American Trial Lawyer's Ass'n Convention, July 25,
1966, Los Angeles, California.
28 PRossma, op. cit. supra note 13, § 64, at 433-34.
2
9 Mahoney v. Bateman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 AtI. 762 (1929); Hamilton v. Boyd,
218 Iowa 885, 256 N.W 290 (1934); Guile v. Greenberg, 192 Minn. 548, 257 N.W
649 (1934).
3o Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1966); O'Keefe v. Kansas City
Ry., 87 Kan. 322, 124 Pac. 416 (1912).
S1 In Wright, supra note 30, plaintiTfs damages from runaway ammals were m-
creased by his negligent failure to have more than one helper. In O'Keefe, supra note
30, plaintiff's negligent intoxication at the time of the accident greatly enhanced the
in]uries caused by the negligence of defendant's servant. See Pnossxm, op. cit. supra
note 13, § 64, at 434 nn. 71-72.
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Applicability of the Doctrines of Assumption
of Risk and Avoidable Consequences
Occasionally, those who propose the seat belt defense, make ref-
erence to such-doctrines as that of assumption of risk, and of mitiga-
tion of damages or avoidable consequences.
The doctrine of assumption of risk is inappropriate in this context
because it is well established that a plaintiff will not be deemed to
have assumed the risk created by a breach of defendant's duty of
reasonable care. A risk is voluntarily assumed within the meaning of
the doctrine when the plaintiff; of his own free will, chooses to expose
himself thereto under circumstances which do not vest hun with a
legal or moral right to do so."2 The defense of assumption of risk arises
only out of a specific relationship between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant in which the former manifests his voluntary consent to relieve
the latter of a duty owed him. It could hardly be said that when the
plaintiff steps into his car he is relieving defendant of the duty to drive
carefully, or that the plaintiff is consenting to "assume the risk" of
defendant's negligent manipulation of his automobile. With or with-
out a seat belt, the plaintiff is in fact requiring the defendant to use
all due care to avoid harming him. Certainly it is as absurd to propose
that the innocent driver is assuming the risk of any injuries caused
to him when he drives without safety belts, as it would be to say that
every commuter assumes the risk of the negligent driving of his neigh-
bor when he chooses to drive to work. Therefore, when a defendant
is under a duty to obey traffic laws and to drive m a reasonable and
prudent manner, other motorists upon the highway are entitled to the
protection afforded thereby, and are not deemed to have assumed any
risk resulting from a violation thereof, even though they knowingly
encounter the danger upon entering onto the highway 3 3 In other
words, although defendant may allege the seat belt defense in the
language of assumption of risk, the defense must stand or fall upon
determination of the applicability of contributory negligence.
The doctrine of avoidable consequences or mitigation of damages
is also not applicable. Under this doctrine a plaintiff is denied recovery
for damages which could have been avoided by reasonable conduct
8 2 See generally HAPYEm & JA Ms, op. cit. supra note 9, § 21.3; PTossan, op. cit.
supra note 13, § 67.
33 Cf. Alpz v. Leiberman, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.S. 703 (1922); Silverman v. Ulrila
Realty Corp., 239 App. Div. 194, 267 N.Y.S. 360 (1933); Siragusa v. The Swedish
Hosp., 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
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on his part followzng the occurrence of the defendant's negligence.3 4
Actually, the doctrine of avoidable consequences is not a defense but
merely a rule of damages by which certain particular items of loss
may be excluded from consideration. It differs from either contribu-
tory negligence or apportionment of damages in that it arises only after
the defendant's wrongdoing.
Conclusion
At the outset the proposed seat belt defense is negated by the
criticisms expressed in Brown v. Kendrick:35
The problem of the seat belts is coming to be more in the public
eye today and there has been some legislative action with regard
thereto. There has been and still exists controversy over the safety
feature of the seat belts. The Flonda Legislature has touched upon
the sub]ect only to the extent of requiring approval of the type to
be used, if used The Congress of the United States has con-
sidered several bills pertaining to motor vehicle and highway safety
but in neither bill as approved, has there been a mandatory use of
seat belts. Further research is requested and required and a com-
mittee established therefore with directions to report back to the
Secretary of Commerce. So, in this state of quandary, the plaintiff and
defendant could each have argued on the merits of the use of seat
belts, but each argument would necessarily have been conjectural
and of doubtful propriety . Certainly, as pointed out by the
appellee, the plaintiff's failure to fasten her seat belt was not such
negligence as to contribute to the occurrence of the accident, nor to
be the proximate contributing cause of the injury in the absence of
a showing that the accident could have been avoided in the absence
of such a negligent act.36
The legal fallacy in the argument given in support of the proposed
defense is its failure to take into account the established rule that a
motorist has a right to assume that others upon the highway will obey
the traff[c laws, and he need not take protective measures against the
mere possibility of some future negligent act by another.
Various absurd conclusions can be envisioned if the logic of the
seat belt defense reasoning were extended. There are innumerable
protective measures, just as plausible as wearing a seat belt, that could
be taken to guard against the future possibility of another's negligence.
Would not a motorist be guilty of contributory negligence for failing
to wear a shoulder harness, for failing to wear a crash helmet, for
84 See generally McConmncx DAmAGES § 33 (1935).
35 Brown v. Kendnck, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
80 Id. at 51. (Footnotes omitted.)
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failing to drive an armored car, for failing to utilize all of these pro-
tective devices at the same time? The utility of these devices, as pro-
tective measures, are certainly as valuable as the use of seat belts. Yet
if the plaintiff would not be contributorily negligent for failing to use
any or all of these protective devices, why should he be barred for
failing to wear a seat belt?
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the proposed seat belt de-
fense is that it would constitute a complete repudiation of the public
policy shaping tort law today It would not further the compensation
of accident victims; to the contrary it would cut them off from com-
pensation. It would not aid in distributing accident losses through
the insurance of those whose conduct caused the accident; instead it
would place the full burden on the injured individual and frustrate
loss distribution. It would scarcely be an incentive for negligent drivers
to drive more carefully; rather its effect would be to immunize the
negligent driver from all liability for his negligent conduct which
causes injury to anyone without a seat belt.
